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Abstract. DSGE models are frequently applied tools in modern macroeco-
nomic modelling. They are used to describe the behavior of the economy. The
goal of this paper is to capture the dynamics of the labour market in a small
open economy. For our estimation we chose a specific DSGE model and ap-
plied it to the Hungarian economy. This model contains search and matching
mechanisms, while the wages and the worked hours are the result of the Nash
bargaining problem. The wage and price rigidities are modelled according to
the approach developed by Rotemberg. This method somewhat differs from
the widely used Calvo price setting. The model is able to capture the great
degree of openness of the Hungarian economy and the relatively high levels of
frictions. Furthermore the model confirms the weakness of the trade unions.
Surprisingly, the results show quite low influence of the labour market on the
dynamics of the rest of the economy.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we try to investigate the labour market dynamics of the Hungarian economy in the time
period from the second quarter of 2001 to the fourth quarter of 2013. Our selection therefore covers only
the inflation targeting era. For the estimation, we use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model developed and estimated by Albertini et al. [1]. They used New Zealand data and managed to
get a reasonable estimate of the behavior of the real economy.
Significant amount of papers with similar aiming were created in the past two decades. The article of
Mortensen and Pissarides [7] can be considered pioneering in the developing of the search and matching
framework. Their work serves as a basis for many researchers and macroeconomic modellers. Incorporat-
ing these search and matching mechanisms into their paper, Jakab and Ko´nya [4] estimated a model for
the Hungarian economy for the period from 1995 to 2008. They divided the data to two periods given the
introduction of inflation targeting in 2001 and carried out two separate estimations. They found out that
many of the model parameters were affected only partially by this change, for example price stickiness
slightly increased while the bargaining power of workers remained unaltered. The same model was also
estimated for the Czech economy by Neˇmec[9].
The price and wage frictions in this paper are modelled according to the approach developed by
Rotemberg [12]. Same pricing method was chosen by Zanetti [13], who investigated the impact of intro-
ducing trade unions into a DSGE model. He found the model with unions to be better at replicating
the business cycle properties of the euro area, than the model without them. Also using Rotemberg-style
price stickiness, Neugebauer and Wesselbaum [8] compared models with and without wage and price
rigidities. Their analysis on United States data shows, that the model with rigidities is significantly bet-
ter at matching the properties of the observed data, than the model with no frictions. Modelling nominal
rigidities based on Rotemberg [12] differs in some aspects from the widely used Calvo [3] approach. As
pointed out by Lombardo and Vestin [5], Rotemberg-style price adjustment causes real costs for all firms.
On the other side, Calvo-style price setting allows only a section of firms to change their prices. This
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causes a movement of demand between firms with and without optimized prices. For detailed discussion
about the two types of price setting see Ascari et al. [2], Lombardo and Vestin [5] or Nistico´ [10].
1.1 Characteristics of Hungarian economy
The growth of Hungarian gross domestic product was really stable until the first signs of crisis appeared
in 2007. The attempt to recover from this situation failed completely after the main wave of the financial
crisis hit the country in 2008. Since then the output has a downward trend. In 2001 inflation targeting
was applied by the central bank. The target was continuously adjusted down from 7% to its present
value of 3%. This helped to reduce the inflation from over 10% in 2000 to 3% in 2013. The average
unemployment rate in the examined period was around 8%. It grew gradually from 5.5% in 2002 to its
maximum of more than 11% in 2010, partially because of the crisis. The worked hours were fluctuating
almost perfectly around their average, thus did not change significantly in the long run. On the other
hand, the wage was strongly influenced by the crisis and dropped considerably. The data show, that
while wages and hours are less volatile than the output, the volatilities of unemployment and vacancies
are much higher. Furthermore, the hours and the wages are lagged behind the output by three periods
and the unemployment by one.
2 The model
The small open economy model developed by Albertini et al. [1] is estimated in this paper. It is
characterized by a non-Walrasian labour marker with search and matching fictions based on Mortensen
and Pissarides [7]. Homogenous workers and firms meet at this market and negotiate the wage and the
amount of hours worked through a Nash bargaining process. No capital or government is present. Price
and wage setting problem is separated between two distinct types of domestic firms. Foreign products
are imported and sold unaltered on the final good market. The model contains several kinds of frictions.
First, the matching function ensures a certain delay, so the unemployed do not find jobs instantly. Second,
vacancy creation is costly, so the firms do not post jobs recklessly. Finally, firms have to pay a certain
adjustment cost if they want to change the wages or prices.
2.1 Labour market
At each time period t, workers can be employed or unemployed. On the other side, job positions can
be filled or vacant. The number of new worker–vacancy pairs, Mt is given by Cobb-Douglas matching
function with constant returns to scale:
Mt = ε
m
t S
ν
t V
1−ν
t , (1)
where εmt is the shock of matching efficiency, St is the number of job seekers, Vt is the number of vacancies
and parameter 0 < ν < 1 represents the elasticity of the matching function. The evolution of employment,
Nt can be written as:
Nt = (1− ρx)Nt−1 +Mt, (2)
where ρx is the exogenous and constant rate of job destruction. Considering constant labour force, L
(and normalizing it to 1), the number of seekers is defined by the following equation:
St = 1− (1− ρx)Nt−1. (3)
Therefore the number of seekers is different from the number of unemployed (Ut = 1 − Nt = St −Mt).
Moreover, employees who lose their job in time t can be re-employed in the same period.
2.2 Agents
The model consists of three agents: homogenous households, firms, and monetary authority. The utility
of households depends on the amount of leisure and consumption, Ct. The set of consumption goods is
defined as a combination of domestic and imported goods. The decision making is given by the following
utility function:
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
βtεct
[
log(Ct − ϑC¯t−1)−Ntκht
h1+φht
1 + φh
]
. (4)
Parameter 0 < β < 1 is the standard discount factor, εct is the preference shock, ϑ is the parameter of
habit. κht represents the parameter of disutility from working, φh is the inverse of Frisch elasticity and ht
is the hours the household decides to work. The income of households consists of wage, unemployment
benefits, interests from holding bonds and profits from holding firms shares.
Three kinds of firms are present in the economy. The first kind of the firms is represented by producers
of domestic intermediate goods, who are the only firms hiring workers. They sell their products at a
perfectly competitive market to the second type of firms, the domestic final good producers. Importers
represent the third category. They offer differentiated foreign goods at the domestic market. The last two
operate on monopolistically competitive markets, thus they can set the prices of their goods. However,
they face quadratic price adjustment costs, as in Rotemberg [12].
Labour is the only input used by the intermediate good producers. The output, YI,t is determined by
a production function:
YI,t = ε
a
t (Ntht)
ζ , (5)
where εat is the productivity shock, ζ is the labor share, Nt represents the workers and ht the hours.
Maximization of profit comes from the following function:
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
βt
λt
λ0
[
mctYI,t − Wt
PH,t
htNt − Γ(Vt)−Υ(Wt)Nt
]
, (6)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier from the households maximization problem. mct is the price for which
the intermediate good producers sell their goods to the final good producers. Wt is the nominal wage,
Γ(Vt) is the hiring cost and Υ(Wt) is the wage adjustment cost. The hiring cost has the following form
(taken from Rotemberg [11]):
Γ(Vt) =
κvt
e
Vt
e, (7)
where κvt > 0 is the scaling factor and e > 0 is the elasticity of creating a vacancy. For the case when
e = 1, the marginal cost of hiring a new employee is constant. The wage adjustment cost function has
the following form:
Υ(Wt) =
ψW
2
(
piw,t
p˜iw,t−1
− 1
)2
htYI,t, (8)
where ψW is the wage adjustment cost parameter, piw,t = Wt/Wt−1 is the wage inflation and p˜iw,t−1 =
piγWw,t−1p¯i
γW
w . Parameter γW serves as the weight of the wage from the previous period in the wage setting
process. Wage is set along with the worked hours in a Nash bargaining process. Here the total surplus
is being divided between the firms and the workers:
maxϕ1−ξtt µ
ξt
t , (9)
where ϕt is the surplus of households, µt is the surplus of firms and parameter 0 < ξt < 1 represents the
bargaining power of firms.
The profit functions of the domestic final good producers and the importers look similar as the profit
function in equation (6). However, they do not have wage and hiring costs and instead of wage setting
cost, they face price adjustment costs.
Finally, the monetary policy is present via a simple Taylor rule:
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Thus when the monetary authority sets the nominal interest rates, it takes into consideration the interest
rates from the previous period, the expected inflation, the output and the nominal exchange rate, et.
3 Estimation results
For the estimation of the model we use quarterly data of the Hungarian economy from the second quarter
of 2001 to the last quarter of 2013. Eleven observed variables are selected – eight for the domestic
economy and three for the foreign sector (represented by countries of the euro area). The variables are
gross domestic product per economically active population, CPI inflation, nominal interest rate, real
effective exchange rate, unemployment rate, average hours per worker, real wage, number of vacancies
per economically active population and for the foreign economy: output, inflation and nominal interest
rate. These data sets are acquired from the OECD and Bloomberg databases. All of them are seasonally
adjusted and filtered. Domestic and foreign inflations and interest rates are demeaned and the remaining
seven are detrended using Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter λ = 1600. The Dynare 4.4.2
toolbox for MATLAB was used for the estimations.
We calibrate the model using some values from the available literature and some calculated from the
data. The discount factor β is set to a frequently used value 0.99. The share of foreign goods in the
domestic consumption is calculated as the import share on GDP and set to 0.4. The share of labour in
production is set to 66%. Debt elasticity of financial risk premium is set to 0.001 according to Jakab and
Ko´nya [4]. The steady state of the scaling factor, κv is set to 0.05 as in Lubik [6]. The scaling factor
to disutility of work, κh is set in a way to get 1/3 of hours worked from the total amount of time. The
steady state value of unemployment is calculated as the average value in the observed period and set to
0.082. The steady state of job finding rate (f¯ = 0.18) is taken from Jakab and Ko´nya [4]. Given the
steady state equations, the separation rate is calculated as ρx = f¯(1−N¯)
N¯(1−f¯) = 0.0196.
Table 1 contains the prior densities of the estimated parameters. The prior for the deep-habit param-
eter is set like in Jakab and Ko´nya [4] to detect possible differences between the estimation results. The
inverse of Frisch elasticity and the elasticity of substitution between domestis and foreign goods are set
to 1. The bargaining power of firms is set to 0.8 with respect to the fact, that Hungarian trade unions
are weak. With no information on the elasticity of matching, we decided to use the value in the middle
of its (0,1) interval. As in Albertini et al. [1] or Lubik [6], the elasticity of vacancy adjustment is set to
show linear hiring cost (e = 1). However, the large variance allows the cost function to change its form
to concave or convex. We kept the price and wage setting parameters as they are stated in Albertini et
al. [1] and combined the monetary policy parameters from Albertini et al. [1] and Jakab and Ko´nya [4].
Description Symbol Prior density Posterior mean 90% HPDI
Habit ϑ β(0.6, 0.15) 0.4621 [0.3453;0.5794]
Inverse of Frisch elasticity φh Γ(1, 0.2) 1.2297 [1.0914;1.3550]
El. of substitution (dom. & for.) η Γ(1, 0.2) 0.5275 [0.4020;0.6613]
Bargaining power of firms ξ β(0.8, 0.1) 0.9252 [0.8515;0.9956]
Elasticity of matching ν β(0.5, 0.2) 0.7475 [0.6224;0.8646]
Elasticity of vacancy creation e Γ(1, 0.5) 3.4066 [2.7184;4.0442]
Price and wage setting
Backward looking price (dom. good) γH β(0.75, 0.1) 0.7814 [0.6835;0.8719]
Backward looking price (for. good) γF β(0.75, 0.1) 0.8224 [0.7387;0.9329]
Backward looking wage parameter γW β(0.75, 0.1) 0.6582 [0.5389;0.7805]
Price adjustment cost (dom. good) ψH Γ(50, 15) 33.7960 [22.9016;46.8907]
Price adjustment cost (for. good) ψF Γ(50, 15) 71.4257 [51.8088;85.4372]
Wage adjustment cost ψW Γ(50, 15) 7.2486 [4.9227;9.5241
Monetary policy
Interest rate smooth. ρr β(0.5, 0.1) 0.4645 [0.3064;0.5982]
Inflation ρpi Γ(1.5, 0.25) 3.5043 [2.9219;4.0426]
Output gap ρY N (0.25, 0.1) 0.1359 [0.0490;0.2315]
Difference of output ρ∆Y N (0.25, 0.1) 0.2068 [0.0576;0.3313]
Exchange rate ρe N (0.25, 0.1) 0.5216 [0.3545;0.6731]
Table 1 Estimation results (parameters)
Prior density: β(0.5, 0.2) Prior density: Γ−1(0.01,∞)
Description Persist. Post. mean 90% HPDI St. dev. Post. mean 90% HPDI
Productivity ρa 0.5686 [0.4327;0.7067] σa 0.0115 [0.0096;0.0133]
UIP ρuip 0.7590 [0.6828;0.8401] σuip 0.0066 [0.0047;0.0085]
Preference ρc 0.4930 [0.3850;0.6076] σc 0.0756 [0.0592;0.0918]
Cost-push ρH 0.3061 [0.1541;0.4429] σH 0.4854 [0.3316;0.6434]
Monetary ρm 0.1193 [0.0335;0.1999] σm 0.0243 [0.0175;0.0309]
Matching ρχ 0.4126 [0.2879;0.5372] σχ 0.1184 [0.0990;0.1375]
Bargaining ρξ 0.4373 [0.2321;0.6740] σξ 0.0738 [0.0043;0.1499]
Vacancy ρv 0.6508 [0.4653;0.8291] σv 0.0100 [0.0023;0.0178]
Disutility of work ρh 0.1415 [0.0333;0.2450] σh 0.0999 [0.0718;0.1269]
For. output ρY ∗ 0.7539 [0.6477;0.8599] σY ∗ 0.0048 [0.0040;0.0055]
For. inflation ρpi∗ 0.5928 [0.4606;0.7320] σ∗i 0.0017 [0.0014;0.0019]
For. int. rate ρi∗ 0.6889 [0.6188;0.7621] σpi∗ 0.0041 [0.0034;0.0048]
Table 2 Estimation results (shocks)
Table 1 also contains the posterior means and 90% highest posterior density intervals (HDPI) of the
estimated parameters. The estimated value of habit parameter (0.46) is much smaller than the value
estimated by Jakab and Ko´nya [4], 0.68. One of the reasons for this difference could be the presence of
the financial crisis period in our estimation. During recessions the households do not want to or cannot
afford to consume as much as in the previous periods, therefore the weight of the past consumption
declines. The bargaining power of firms is estimated to be really high (0.93), as was originally expected.
This means, that firms get almost all surplus generated by the filled jobs. Also employees have practically
no vote when negotiating wages. Elasticity of vacancy creation is estimated relatively high with value
3.4. This means, that the vacancy creation cost function is convex, thus each additional posted vacancy
costs more, than the previous. The wage and price adjustment parameters show, that it is much easier
(cheaper) to change the wage. Therefore the wages adapt quicker than prices. From the two prices,
it is less costly to adjust the prices of the domestically produced goods. This is probably because the
importers have to take into consideration the varying exchange rates when changing the prices. The
interest rate smoothing parameter in the Taylor rule is relatively small, only 0.46 and the reaction to
inflation is high, 3.5. The estimations of Jakab and Ko´nya [4] are 0.7 and 1.53 respectively. However,
this significant difference can come from the different form of the Taylor rule, since their monetary rule
does not include the gap and the first difference of the output. The estimation results of the persistence
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Figure 1 Variance decomposition of output
and deviation of shocks are presented in table 2. The monetary shock is the less persistent. It takes only
half year for this shock to reach 10% of its initial value, while it takes more than five periods for the
productivity shock to do the same. The cost-push shock is by far the most volatile. On the other hand,
the volatilities of foreign shocks are the lowest.
4 Conclusion
The estimation of parameters seems to be reasonably consistent with the literature. We find rather high
values of price frictions in the Hungarian economy, while the wage frictions are somewhat smaller. The
model also captures the low participation rate in trade unions. Furthermore, we get similar results of
the historical shock decomposition of output as Albertini et al. [1], presented in the figure 1. The model
shows almost no reaction of the output to the labour market shocks. Its fluctuation is given solely by the
non-labour market shocks (in the figure depicted as the sum of the other shocks).
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